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Even though Africa has constantly emphasized the need to reduce deficit financing through 
mobilization of more internal revenues, this has not been achieved. Perhaps encouraging voluntary 
tax compliance can improve internal revenue mobilization. This study explores the relationship 
between ethical orientation and tax compliance and finds that ethical persons are generally more tax 
compliant than unethical persons but are more influenced by considerations of tax rate and 
withholding positions compared to unethical persons. The findings of this study differ from Reckers 
et al. in a number of ways and contribute to the literature by providing a possible explanation of the 
cause(s) of tax non- compliance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Ghana practices a self-assessment system where, 
essentially, tax payers are legally obligated to declare 
their estimated tax liabilities (following prescribed 
formats) and settle the tax due accordingly (Terkper, 
1995). Based on a risk management model and 
evidences provided on self-assessment forms, the Ghana 
Revenue Authority (GRA), which is the state body 
responsible for tax collection), may request for evidence 
or perform an audit to confirm submissions by tax payers. 
Following the opportunity to self-declare tax liabilities, 
self-assessments systems typically over compensate with 
higher penalties for default and under declarations, 
compared to other tax assessment systems. 
The study aims to investigate the effects, if any, of 
individual ethical  attitudes  on  tax  compliance  behavior. 
Bearing in mind the hypothesis that individual ethical 
attitudes influence choices on tax compliance behavior, 
then perhaps a good case is made for its inclusion in 
behavioral decision making models.   
Tax collection has been a challenge for most low 
income countries and Ghana is no exception (Terkper, 
1995). In Ghana, following the recent trend of excessive 
deficit financing and its attendant inflationary and other 
adverse pressures, the government of Ghana, pressured 
by various civil society groups have acknowledged the 
need to increase state sources of revenue especially 
from tax collection (Osei and Quartey, 2005). A focus of 
these efforts has been widening the tax net to cover 
previously untaxed segments, sectors and persons 
especially in the informal sector but as well in  the  formal 
 
E-mail: R.Nsor-Ambal@pgr.reading.ac.uk. 
 
Authors agree that this article remain permanently open access under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution License 4.0 International License 
 
 
 
 
sector. Also, government has heightened its efforts to 
stamp out tax evasion and enforce voluntary compliance 
through a complex set of carrot and stick approaches 
involving tax amnesties, penalties, concessions for 
voluntary disclosure, and public awareness campaigns. 
In Africa, most evasion of taxes is mostly by individual 
and self-employed persons relative to organizations and 
institutions (Goerke, 2014); perhaps due to the fact that 
African economies are cash economies with a high 
number of small scale businesses within the informal 
sector (Delaney, 2013). Individuals exhibit diverse 
behaviors in tax compliance (Alm et al., 1992).   
Concerns about and research on deterioration in 
voluntary compliance are as old as the institution of 
taxation itself. In recent times, studies about tax 
compliance has focused on the behavioral issues, 
particularly the development of models that can help 
predict the likelihood of tax evasion by tax payers and/or 
the decision making model that various tax payer groups 
use in guiding their decision on tax compliance behavior. 
Clotfelter (1983) confirms that, in most cases tax 
noncompliance increases with the tax rate and often non 
compliances decisions by a tax payer are interdependent.  
Whereas it may seem obvious that individual 
differences, especially on ethical values may be an 
important element in decision making models on 
predicting tax compliance behavior, most decision 
making models on tax compliance have excluded 
considerations on individual ethical propensities (Reckers 
et al., 1994; Bobek and Hatfield, 2003). Rather, most 
studies have focused on the implications of tax rates and 
tax-payers consideration of the effects of their decisions 
(prospect framing theory) in making compliance 
decisions. Reckers et al. (1994) argue that the results of 
research into decision making models on tax compliance 
behavior are mostly inconclusive, perhaps due to the 
exclusion of personal ethical considerations of tax 
payers. Where efforts have been made to consider the 
effects of ethics in tax compliance behavior, the focus 
has been on general ethical considerations and social 
norms rather than individual ethical orientations of 
taxpayers (Henderson and Kaplan, 2005). 
Admittedly, studies in other countries have confirmed 
that ethical considerations affect tax compliance 
behaviors (Henderson & Kaplan, 2005; Reckers et al., 
1994). However, none of these studies, so far, has taken 
place in Ghana. Considering the fact that ethical 
considerations can be significantly influenced by culture 
(Collins and Plumlee, 1991; Alm et al., 1995), a study of 
the relationship between individual ethical attitudes and 
culture within the Ghanaian environment is equally 
relevant and adds to the growing body of literature on 
ethics. As well, it supports the need for a critical mass of 
literature relevant for theorization. The rest of the study is 
organized as follows; the next part reviews the related 
literature for ethics and behavioral studies on tax 
compliance;  the   following   parts  discuss  the  research  
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methodology; results and conclusions respectively. 
 
 
TAX COMPLIANCE BEHAVIOR AND ETHICS 
 
Wenzel (2005) defines tax ethics as “one’s belief that 
there is a moral imperative that one should be honest in 
one’s tax dealings”.  
Blasi (1980); Tooke and Ickes (1988) explored the 
relationship between ethical beliefs and behavioral 
choices and suggest that ethical behaviors tend to be 
contextual and case specific (Henderson and Kaplan, 
2005). Haan (1975); Arrington and Reckors (1985), and 
Henderson and Kaplan (2005) argue that, to provide 
credible analysis, measures of ethical beliefs must be 
situation specific. Therefore, even though studies in other 
social disciplines have explored and confirmed that 
personal ethical considerations affect decision matrixes, 
the findings of such studies cannot be automatically 
assumed to hold in behavioral studies on tax compliance. 
Following on from the deterrence theory and the 
classical economic theory of rational utility maximizing 
behavior, Smith and Kinsey (1987); Carroll (1992; 1987) 
suggest that tax payers do a cost-benefit-analysis of 
noncompliance by comparing the value of the marginal 
satisfaction from the monetary rewards of noncompliance 
with the potential cost and/or risk of sanctions (and other 
disutility) from non-compliance. This traditional economic 
model of decision making, suggests that tax payers 
choices are made solely from a perspective of self-
interest (Hodgson, 1988). Therefore, the ‘rational pursuit’ 
of self-interest allows tax payers to consider taxation as a 
cost that they must avoid or reduce and hence a taxpayer 
is likely to evade tax unless the likelihood that he will be 
caught and the severity of punishment makes evasion an 
unattractive option (Wenzel, 2005). Proponents of this 
theory therefore argue that deterrence is an effective 
means of enforcing tax compliance (Allingham and 
Sandmo, 1972; Cowell and Gordon, 1988; Andreoni et 
al., 1998). Alm et al. (1992) and Henderson and Kaplan 
(2005) have however criticized the deterrence theory as 
being narrow and limited in its explanation power of the 
generally wide level of compliance among various 
taxpayers particularly as tax audits, and penalties for tax 
evasion, as well as the cost of other detection 
mechanisms are generally very low. Indeed studies on 
the impact of audit probabilities on tax compliance have 
provided weak and inconclusive results (Fischer et al., 
1992; Slemrod et al., 2001; Spicer and Thomas, 1982; 
Mason and Calvin, 1978, Song and Yarbrough, 
1978, Spicer and Lundstedt, 1976 and Wärneryd and 
Walerud, 1982). Evidence of the relationship between 
penalties (such as fines) and tax compliance also 
provides inconsistent results (Fischer et al., 1992; Park 
and Hyun, 2003; Friedland et al., 1978). 
Wenzel (2005) and Henderson and Kaplan (2005) find 
that tax  compliance  is  influenced  by  a  complex  mix of  
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individual ethical propensities and other social norms 
(James et al., 2001; Tyler, 1990).  
Etzioni (1988) proposes that ethical considerations and 
values are an interference with a moderating effect on the 
classical economic decision-making model of self-interest 
utility maximization.  Scholz (1985) however contends 
that individual utility functions necessarily incorporate 
considerations of social responsibility as well as self-
interested goals. Either-way ethical values affect the 
decision making process and can affect tax compliance 
decisions by causing tax payers to avoid non-compliance 
and illegal avoidance practices (Baldry, 1987, Jackson 
and Milliron, 1986; Trivedi et al., 2003). 
Carroll (1987); Smith (1990); and Etzoini (1988) argue 
that an individuals’ ethical propensity affects tax 
compliance behavior by providing a broad framework of 
possibilities and boundaries from which choices can be 
made (Grasmick and Bursik, 1990; Reckers et al., 
1994; Sheffrin and Triest, 1992). Therefore high ethical 
values affect the decision making process by limiting 
choices available to the tax payer as well as the process 
to be used to achieve a given outcome (Reckers et al., 
1994) and hence may override a ‘rational’ consideration 
of self-interest utility maximization. 
Kohlberg (1976) argues that each individual has a 
different set of ethical values. Therefore not all tax payers 
will view tax evasion with a high sense of morality 
(Reckers et al, 1994; Henderson and Kaplan 2005). 
Accepting Kohlberg’s (1976) proposal that individuals 
have different ethical propensities, tax payers can be 
assumed to differ on an ‘honesty characteristics’ and can 
be grouped into different categories (Clotfelter, 1983).  
Hessing et al. (1992) for instance identify three types of 
tax payers; tax payers who never evade tax; tax payers 
who will occasionally try to evade tax; and tax payers 
who will regularly try to evade tax. Clotfelter (1983) 
confirms that evidence exists that some tax payers never 
evade tax. 
Smith (1990) suggests that perhaps, compared to 
traditional economic considerations based on the 
deterrence theory, evidence exist to suggest that 
personal ethical values have a stronger effect on tax 
compliance behavior.  Therefore, compared to deterrence 
factors, individual ethical beliefs have been confirmed to 
have a relatively more significantly verifiable relationship 
with tax compliance (Etzioni, 1988). 
 
 
Effect of tax rate, income levels and outcome framing 
on tax compliance  
 
Findings about the effect of tax rate on tax compliance 
have been mixed (Reckers et al, 1994). Clotfelter (1983) 
finds a positive relationship between the number of tax 
evaders and the rate of tax. Other studies have also 
confirmed a positive relationship  between  tax  rates  and  
 
 
 
 
tax payer non-compliance (Pommerehne and Weck-
Hannemann, 1996; Weck-Hannemann and Pommerehne, 
1989). However, Porcano (1988) and Baldry (1987) find 
no significant relationship between tax rates and tax 
compliance and Dubin and Wilde (1988) find an inverse 
relationship between tax rates and tax compliance. Since 
the applicable tax rate is determined by a person’s level 
of income, then the relationship between income levels 
and tax compliance is also inconclusive (Cox, 1984). 
Alm et al. (1992); Yaniv (1999), Elffers and Hessing 
(1997) and Bernasconi and Zanardi (2004) propose that 
tax payer compliance can be explained with prospect 
theory.  
Deterrence theory is based on a presumption of 
expected total utility where a tax payer is indifferent to a 
‘reference point’ (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and 
makes tax compliance decisions based on an evaluation 
of absolute wealth rather than relative wealth specific to a 
situation. Unlike deterrence theory, prospect theory 
contends that tax payers will evaluate losses and gains 
from any compliance behavior differently and will often 
consider and/or react to the effects of gains separately 
from the effect of loses, even if they relate to the same 
transaction. Based on the prospect theory, tax-payers 
disutility for loss is generally higher than the perceived 
utility from gains and therefore typically, a tax payer will 
make more effort to avoid a loss than to increase gains. 
In the context of framing, taxpayers will be more averse 
to the risk of non-compliance in a situation where tax 
compliance leads to a refund than a tax payment. This is 
because tax payers, based on their ‘reference points’ are 
likely to consider refunds as gains and tax payments as a 
loss. In line with prospect theory Cox and Plumley (1988); 
Chang et al. (1987); Robben et al. (1990) and Carroll 
(1992) find evidence to suggest that voluntary compliance 
increases consistently with the amount of refund that 
taxpayers expect to receive after filing a tax return and 
decreases consistently with the amount of tax to be paid. 
Following prospects theory, Yaniv (1999) demonstrates 
empirically that advance tax payment can substitute for 
the costly detection efforts in enhancing tax compliance 
even though a deliberately high advance tax payment is 
unlikely to eliminate the incentives of noncompliance. 
Elffers and Hessing (1997) argue that when advance 
taxes are higher than the true tax liability, and considering 
that most tax payers evaluate gains and losses (even if 
the relate to the same transaction) differently, tax payers 
are likely to be tax compliant (risk averse) as they expect 
a gain (refund) from filing their return. In such a 
circumstance tax payers may opt to be risk averse and 
be as compliant as possible to benefit from a refund. In 
circumstances where advance tax payments are less 
than the true tax liability, tax, taxpayers perceive a loss 
arising from tax compliance and considering the fact that 
taxpayers are more sensitive to losses than to gains, 
taxpayers may become risk seeking and  opt  to  be  non-  
 
 
 
 
 
 
compliant with their tax obligation even if the amount of 
estimated ‘loss’ is very minimal. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1982) argue that the prospect 
theory, even though relevant, is not completely universal 
and on occasions has provided inconsistent results 
(Robben et al., 1990; Hite et al., 1988; Schadewald, 
1989) and only describes how some individuals will 
behave some of the time.  
Reckers et al. (1994) argue that the inconsistent results 
from deterrence theory and the prospect theory, as well 
as the inconclusive findings on the relationship between 
tax rate and non-compliance could be because other 
considerations such as social norms, ethical consi-
derations and personal characteristics are critical in 
understanding compliance behavior of tax-payers. 
Like Recker et al. (1994), this study hypothesizes that 
an individual’s ethical beliefs plays a critical role in a 
Ghanaian tax payers decisions regarding compliance. 
Essentially, an individual’s ethical beliefs define the 
boundary of available choices to a tax payer and may 
have a moderating effect on prospect framing, deterrence 
mechanisms or expected utility. Therefore (a) different 
tax payers will react to similar scenarios differently based 
on their ethical orientation; and (b) the relationship 
between individual ethical orientation and tax compliance 
is more consistent than the relationship between tax rate 
and/or ‘withholding positions with compliance. Withholding 
position is conceptualized as the estimated gain (refund) 
or loss (tax due) by a tax payer based on a ‘reference 
point’.  
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Most studies on ethics and tax behavior have been based on 
survey studies (Wenzel, 2005). Wenzel (2005) acknowledges the 
limitations of surveys in behavioral studies and proposes that 
experiments provide a more effective mechanism to obtain credible 
results. This study combines a survey methodology with an 
experimental task, in the form of a scenario to obtain relevant 
information of tax payer behavior.  Scenarios are widely used in 
ethics study (Randall and Gibson, 1990) and provide an opportunity 
to measure multiple variables in decision making by respondents. 
All respondents were given a questionnaire comprising four 
sections. Section A requested for demographics of the respondents 
excluding any unique identification information such as names. 
Section B included a test instrument based on a scenario that 
involved a hypothetical case where a tax payer was presented with 
an opportunity to evade tax (adopted with modification from 
Reckers et al., 1994). In line with Madeo et al. (1987), a transaction 
with a relatively low level of detection (a cash transaction from a 
side job with an individual) was used to frame the opportunity for 
evasion. Respondents were asked to evaluate the action of the tax-
payer on a seven point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree 
(coded as 7) to strongly agree (coded as 1). Reckers et al. (1994) 
asked respondents tax payers if they will report appropriately if 
faced with a similar situation based on a hypothetical case. 
Specifically, Reckers et al. (1994) stated ‘If faced with an identical 
situation, I would report the $12,000 in income’ and required 
respondents to provide a response on a six point Likert Scale. 
There is a risk of socially desirable responses  based  on  scenarios  
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that personalizes an action especially if actual behavior is not being 
observed and respondents are relied on to be honest with their 
responses (Bampton and Cowton, 2002). To mitigate this risk, this 
study, as part of the hypothetical scenario enumerates a chosen 
course of action by the actor(s) within the scenario and rather 
requests respondents to state the extent to which they agree with 
the actions of the actor(s) within the scenario. The chosen course of 
action of the actor(s) within the scenario was to opt to evade tax 
and as such a response of strongly disagree (coded as 7) will 
suggest a respondent was unwilling to evade tax whereas a 
response on strongly agree (coded as 1) will suggest a respondent 
was willing to evade tax if faced with a similar scenario. 
To confirm this analogy, a second question was framed in the 
manner of Reckers et al. (1994). Specifically respondents were 
asked to state their agreement or otherwise on a seven point Likert 
scale to the statement that ‘‘If faced with an identical situation, I 
would report the GHS2,000 in income’. Responses to this 
statement were only used to confirm the credibility of responses to 
the earlier question that required respondents to state their 
agreement or otherwise with the choice of action by the actors in 
the scenario. 
Section C attempted to measure respondents ethical orientation 
about that evasion and specifically asked respondents if tax 
evasion was wrong at all times and in any amount. Respondents 
provided their responses on a seven point Likert scale similar to 
section B with strongly disagree coded as 1 and strongly agree 
coded as 7. 
Section D was a post experimental questionnaire that measured 
among other things, respondents’ opinion on whether the tests 
provided anonymity and whether they were free to choose any 
response they preferred. Each section was preceded by 
instructions to guide respondents on what was required of them. 
Each respondent received an identical survey instrument and 
experimental task. However, the experimental task was similar in all 
material aspects except for the tax rate and the withholding 
positions. The marginal tax rather used in a scenario was either 
22.5 or 15%. The withholding position for each scenario either 
involved a situation of a refund or tax due after filing of annual tax 
returns.  Overall therefore four different set of scenarios were used; 
tax rate of 22.5% with a situation of a refund; tax rate of 22.5% with 
a situation of tax due; tax rate of 15% with a situation of a refund; 
tax due of 15% with a situation of tax due. Each respondent 
received only one scenario, which was randomly assigned so as to 
mitigate the bias from subjects knowledge about the intend 
objective of the manipulations.  
The scenario used in Reckers et al. (1994) and this study did not 
provide the income level of the hypothetical tax payer so as to avoid 
the likelihood of confounding any rate effect that the study may 
reveal. It is unlikely that most respondents will be able to compute 
accurately the appropriate level of income from the rates provided 
within their case because often individuals do not know their own 
marginal rate of tax (Lewis, 1978) as most tax payers pay very little 
attention to tax matters (Reckers et al., 1994). Therefore to allow for 
a meaningful comparison of the effects of tax rates, this study, 
unlike Reckers et al. (1994), provides a hypothetical reference point 
for comparison of tax rates by stating that the average marginal rate 
of tax for most Ghanaians is at 17.5% 
The sample was made up of self-employed persons mainly within 
the capital city of Ghana, who are required to file their own tax 
returns at specified periods and pay the relevant tax due or claim 
the appropriate refund. This sample group was preferred because, 
unlike employees who are subjected to obligatory deduction at 
source and often have no requirement to file returns at year end, 
self-employed persons represented an appropriate segment of 
society with an opportunity and perhaps a desire to be non-
compliant. Self-employed person was defined to include 
‘independent  contractors’,  sole  proprietorships  and  partnerships.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of respondents. 
 
Age group Income group Male Female 
18<X<30 
10K>=X 3 2 
10K<X=<50K 2 9 
50K<X=<100K 3 0 
100K<X 2 1 
    
30<X<50 
10K>=X 3 3 
10K<X=<50K 7 4 
50K<X=<100K 4 2 
100K<X 4 2 
    
50<X 
10K>=X 0 0 
10K<X=<50K 1 5 
50K<X=<100K 1 0 
100K<X 2 0 
Total 32 28 
 
 
 
Businesses with ‘limited liability’ were excluded. 
 
 
Regression equation 
 
An OLS regression is performed using SPSS on the following 
equation 
 
TEvade= a + B1TRate+ B2WHTPosition + B3 Ethics + B4 (TRate X 
Ethics) + B6 (WHTPosition X Ethics) + (WHTPosition X TRate)+ ei 
Where TEvade = Likelihood to evade tax; Ethics =Individual 
Ethical Orientation (influenced to some extent by social norms); 
TRate = Marginal Tax rate (coded as 0 for 15% and 1 for 22.5%); 
WHTPosition (Withholding position coded as 0 for refund and 1 for 
tax payment). 
 
However please note that the essence of this study is not to 
provide a prediction model for tax compliance. Rather it is to 
emphasis the critical and perhaps moderating effect of individual 
ethical orientation on compliance decisions. 
 
 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
80 questionnaires (with test instruments) were distributed 
and 60 useable responses were received implying a 
response rate of 75%.  A descriptive statistics of the 
respondents is provided in Table 1. Using Chi Square 
tests, no significant effect on responses was based on 
age, marital status, income level, and gender. A t-test of 
relatedness also suggests’ no significant differences 
between early and late responses. 
All three independent variables are significant (at 5%) 
in the prediction of tax compliance. Hence variations in 
the tax rate (t=-2.1, p=0.036), as well as the likelihood of 
refunds (t=2.2, p=0.032) had a significant influence on tax 
payers compliance behavior. Compared to the  other  two  
 
 
 
 
independent variables however, individual ethical orien-
tation was the most significant factor in determining the 
likelihood of tax compliance among Ghanaian taxpayers 
(t=3.09, p=0.003) (Table 2).  
The interactions between the independent variables 
also reveals that an individual’s ethical orientation 
interacts with the tax rate to influence compliance 
behavior (t=2.4, p=0.022). However, unlike Reckers et al. 
(1994), this study suggests that individuals with a high 
sense of morality, who believed that tax evasion was 
morally wrong, were more greatly influenced by 
considerations of the tax rate than ‘unethical persons’. 
For instance, on average a highly ethical person (with a 
score of 7 on the Likert Scale) varied his response by 
1.262 [computed as -1.132 + (0.342 *7)] compared to -
0.79 [computed as -1.132 + (0.342 *1)] for unethical 
persons (with a score on 1 on the Likert Scale). Reckers 
et al. (1994) find the opposite in their study. Despite this 
however, ethical persons, even after being influenced by 
considerations of the tax rate and withholding positions, 
still remained largely more tax compliant than unethical 
persons. The explanation for this behavior of ethical 
persons doing ‘unethical things’ may lay in the preposition 
by Bersoff (1999) of ‘motivated reasoning’. It will seem 
that unethical persons’ are less influenced by other 
variables except their own extreme self- interest devoid of 
considerations of relativism. However considering the fact 
that considerations of ethics are sometimes influenced by 
social norms, perceptions of what is socially desirable 
can influence ethical behavior.  The fact that ethical 
persons are relatively more easily subjected to influences 
is therefore grounded in existing theory. 
Following on from existing theory, a scenario of low tax 
rate, with refund is expected to result in the most tax 
compliant behavior among tax payers, if the effects of 
ethics are not considered. The results of this study 
showed that in such a scenario, highly ethical person’s 
average a compliance score of 6.599 (which per the 
Likert scale suggest a high rate of tax compliance) 
compared to 2.867 for unethical persons
1
. In a scenario 
of high tax, no refund (rather a tax payment), highly 
ethical persons averaged a compliance score of 5.829 
compared to 0.729 for unethical persons. 
Even though the interaction between ethics and 
withholding position is not significant, highly ethical 
persons are more heavily swayed by considerations of 
outcome framing than unethical persons even though 
ethical persons still remain largely more tax compliant 
than unethical persons after considerations of outcome 
framing. Therefore prospects with the same monetary 
outcome may results in different compliance behaviors 
due to the ethical orientation of the tax payers. 
                                                          
1Computed from the OLS regression TEvade= a -1.13TRate+ 1.23WHTPosition 
+ 0.51 Ethics + 0.34 (TRate X Ethics) + 0.11 (WHTPosition X Ethics) -0.91 
(WHTPosition X TRate)+ ei with TRate = code 0; Ethics = 7 on the Likert 
Scale; WHTPosition = code 1)  
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Table 2. OLS regression scores. 
 
Dimension Unstandardized coefficients T Stat Significance F Ratio 
Ethics 0.508 3.087 0.003 
 
 
 
35.661; Significant at 0.000 
Tax Rate -1.132 -2.148 0.036 
Withholding Position 1.234 2.197 0.032 
Tax Rate x Ethics 0.342 2.363 0.022 
Withholding  x Ethics 0.114 0.762 0.449 
Withholding x Tax Rate -0.906 -1.815 0.075 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS 
 
The findings of this research suggest that tax rate, 
withholding position and individual ethical orientation can 
influence a tax-payers compliance behavior. Overall 
ethical persons are more tax compliant than unethical 
persons. Ethical orientation has a relatively stronger 
predictive power than tax rate and withholding position on 
tax compliance. However tax rate and withholding 
positions interact with ethics in that; very ethical persons 
can be marginally influenced to change their compliance 
behavior (compared to unethical persons) due to the 
withholding position or the tax rate. Even in such a 
situation however, ethical persons still remain significantly 
more compliant than unethical persons. This is a 
departure from Reckers et al. (1994) who find that ethical 
persons are relatively less influenced by considerations 
of tax rates and withholding positions. In this study, even 
though morality may have been mediated by 
considerations of tax rates and withholding positions, the 
extent of influence does not aggravate the tax 
compliance behavior of ethical persons to levels 
comparable to unethical persons. This is still a cause for 
concern because in Ghana, considerations of ethical 
orientation are influenced more significantly by social 
norms and cultural values, perhaps in greater proportion 
compared to western economies and as such wide 
spread non-compliance especially among unethical 
persons, if not checked could influenced the behavior of 
ethical persons. 
The findings of this study support the preposition of 
Reckers et al. (1994) that decision making models on tax 
compliance will be more effective if they incorporate non-
monetary variables such as individual ethical orientation. 
This study however differs from the pioneering study by 
Reckers et al. (1994) in a number of ways. Firstly, 
whereas Reckers et al. (1994) find a significant interaction 
of ethics on withholding positions among USA tax payers, 
this study rather finds a significant interaction of ethics on 
tax rates among Ghanaian tax payers. Secondly, this 
study suggests that ethical persons are more influenced 
by tax rates and withholding positions even though they 
still remain largely more ethical than ‘unethical’ persons. 
Reckers et al. (1994) find the opposite  among  USA  Tax  
payers. 
In generalizing the findings of this research, due regard 
must be paid to the limitations of the methodology used. 
Essentially, the findings of this study, are based on a 
principal assumption, as with other experimental tests, 
that respondents, will respond in the same manner during 
the test as they will when confronted with an actual 
scenario (Reckers et al., 1994). Whilst the researcher has 
no reason to believe that respondents hid their real 
behavior (especially based on the number of ‘negative 
responses’ provided, as well as the visible efforts by the 
researcher to ensure anonymity), the results provided 
may be specific to the context provided (Henderson & 
Kaplan 2005). Therefore it is possible that a revision of 
the construct of the scenario, such as the source of 
income under consideration (Madeo et al., 1987), the 
penalties for default etc, could have an effect on the 
response and reaction of taxpayers. 
Secondly, converting a purely qualitative measure 
(TEvasion) into a continuous variable in order to perform 
a regression analysis has limitations. However, studies 
have used a similar approach especially when the 
qualitative variable is of a ranking nature, as is the case 
of this research, on a Likert scale (Nunnally, 1978). Also, 
the sample size of 60 participants may not be 
representative of the entire population. Judge et al (1985) 
argue findings from a small sample size are still relevant, 
if the data set does not include outliers, as is the case 
with this research). Lastly, McGee (2012) argues that tax 
evasion may not always be unethical and hence non-
compliance behavior cannot necessarily be seen as 
unethical. This study does not presume compliance 
behavior as ethical or non-ethical but rather seeks to 
suggest that ethical persons are more compliant than 
unethical persons. Therefore the conclusions of this study 
are not in any way contradictory to McGee (2012). 
Moreover, the scenarios applied in the experimental test 
do not provide enough background to support occasions 
where non-compliance can be judged as ethical. 
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